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Unfounded convictions involving beliefs in the paranormal, grandiosity ideas or
suspicious thoughts are endorsed at varying degrees among the general population.
Here, we investigated the neurobiopsychological basis of the observed inter-individual
variability in the propensity toward unfounded beliefs. One hundred two healthy
individuals were genotyped for four polymorphisms in the COMT gene (rs6269, rs4633,
rs4818, and rs4680, also known as val158met) that define common functional haplotypes
with substantial impact on synaptic dopamine degradation, completed a questionnaire
measuring unfounded beliefs, and took part in a behavioral experiment assessing
perceptual inference. We found that greater dopamine availability was associated with
a stronger propensity toward unfounded beliefs, and that this effect was statistically
mediated by an enhanced influence of expectations on perceptual inference. Our
results indicate that genetic differences in dopaminergic neurotransmission account
for inter-individual differences in perceptual inference linked to the formation and
maintenance of unfounded beliefs. Thus, dopamine might be critically involved in the
processes underlying one’s interpretation of the relationship between the self and the
world.
Keywords: dopamine, COMT, haplotype, visual perception, beliefs
Introduction
Beliefs constitute a representation of the world and provide the basis for the experience to be a self
within it (Kircher and Leube, 2003; Connors and Halligan, 2014). However, although confronted
with the same external reality, humans differ in their beliefs about the world. For instance, while
many people passionately believe in spiritual healing, horoscopes or telepathy, others vehemently
reject the idea of phenomena that are not directly supported by empirical evidence. Unfounded
convictions involving beliefs in the paranormal, grandiosity ideas or suspicious thoughts are
endorsed at varying degrees by individuals of the general population (Peters et al., 1999).
Interestingly, there is converging evidence that such unfounded beliefs in the healthy lie on a
continuumwith delusions in individuals suffering from psychosis (Freeman, 2006; Linscott and van
Os, 2013; Zavos et al., 2014), and alterations in the self-related processes have been demonstrated
for both unfounded beliefs in the healthy (Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992) and delusions in psychotic
individuals (Smári et al., 1994). This suggests that the tendency toward unfounded beliefs represents
a continuously distributed phenotype that in its extreme form can lead to significant distress
and social isolation. However, the neurobiological bases underlying the observed inter-individual
variability in the propensity toward unfounded beliefs have remained elusive.
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Influential theories of brain function describe beliefs as an
internal model of the world that serves to generate expectations
that structure incumbent sensory information in order to create
meaningful perceptual experiences (Mumford, 1992; Friston,
2005). Accordingly, a stronger influence of expectations on
sensory processing would result in the tendency to perceive the
world to a greater extent in conformity with expected meaning
and to a lesser extent in conformity with the external reality,
thus leading to unfounded beliefs. In support of this theory,
empirical work has consistently linked unfounded beliefs with
an increased influence of expectations on visual perception. For
instance, paranormal beliefs and magical ideation have been
associated to an increased willingness to perceive expected yet
non-existent contents in visual noise (Tsakanikos and Reed, 2005;
Krummenacher et al., 2010; Riekki and Lindeman, 2013; Van Elk,
2013). Furthermore, we have recently shown that the tendency
toward delusional ideation in healthy individuals is related to
the effect of experimentally induced cognitive expectations on
reported perception, and, notably, also on early visual processing
(Schmack et al., 2013a). This suggests that individual differences
in the propensity toward unfounded beliefs are related to
individual differences in the neural mechanisms that govern
visual perception.
Here, we sought to elucidate the neurobiological
underpinnings of the link between perceptual inference
mechanisms and unfounded beliefs. As dopamine (DA) has
consistently been implicated in the formation of pathological
forms of unfounded beliefs, i.e., delusions (for recent reviews see
Howes and Kapur, 2009; Pankow et al., 2012), we asked whether
genetic differences in dopaminergic neurotransmission might
provide the basis for differences in perceptual inference and
thereby explain the observed inter-individual variability in the
tendency toward unfounded beliefs. One hundred two healthy
individuals were genotyped for common functional haplotypes
of catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) that account for
significant variations in DA degradation (Diatchenko et al.,
2005; Nackley et al., 2006), completed a validated questionnaire
that measures the tendency toward unfounded, delusion-like
beliefs (Peters et al., 1999), and took part in a visual perception
experiment that assessed the role of cognitive expectations in
perceptual inference (Figure 1, Sterzer et al., 2008; Schmack et al.,
2013a). We hypothesized that greater genetically determined DA
availability would be associated with a stronger tendency toward
unfounded beliefs, and that this association would be mediated
by a stronger effect of cognitive expectations in perceptual
inference.
Materials and Methods
Participants
One hundred nine healthy volunteers were recruited via mailing
lists of Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin and Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin. Seven participants were excluded from
further analyses due to technical problems during data collection
or haplotype analysis (see below) yielding a final sample of
102 participants (53 females, 24.9 ± 4.7 years [mean ± SD]).
Behavioral results from the same sample, i.e., the effect of
learned expectations on perception and its correlation with
the tendency toward unfounded beliefs (see Section COMT
Haplotype Distribution), but not the genetic data were presented
in a previous publication (Schmack et al., 2013a). The current
sample (n = 102) lacked 4 participants of the previous sample
that were excluded due to problems during genotyping (see
Section Participants). In addition, the current sample (n =
102) included one participant that was not included in the
previous sample due to problems in data collection during
an additional experiment presented in our previous work but
not here (see Section “Materials and Methods, Experimental
design, Behavioral Experiment 1” in Schmack et al., 2013a).
All participants were naive with regard to the purpose of the
experiment, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no
Axis I psychiatric disorder (Structured Clinical Interview for
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition, Axis I Disorders). Participants gave written informed
consent and received monetary remuneration for their time.
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Charité -
Universitätsmedizin Berlin and conducted in accordance with
the declaration of Helsinki.
Genotype and Haplotype Estimation
To address genetic differences in DA neurotransmission, we
analyzed four single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) of the
DA degrading enzyme COMT that form previously described
haplotypes with functional consequences on enzymatic protein
function (Diatchenko et al., 2005). A fifth frequent SNP in
the COMT gene was analyzed for control purposes. DNA was
extracted from venous blood samples following a standard high-
salt procedure. Genotyping was conducted using TaqMan R©
assays and was executed on an ABI Prism R© 7500 Sequence
Detection System with an Allelic Discrimination program
within the ABI software (Applied Biosystems, Foster City,
CA). Four SNPs defining the previously described haplotype
were genotyped: rs6269 (−98A>G), rs4633 (186C>T, his62his),
rs4818 (408C>G, leu136 leu), rs4860 (472G>A, val158met).
To test whether we could reproduce the previously defined
haplotypes (Diatchenko et al., 2005) in our sample, we
genotyped an additional control SNP in the COMT gene
(rs165599, 522G>A) which we expected not to form part
of the haploblock. None of the SNPs deviated significantly
from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (p > 0.1, chi-square test).
Haplotype block analysis was performed using the software
Haploview 4.2 (Barrett et al., 2005) and revealed three common
haplotypes in line with previous work (Diatchenko et al.,
2005):
(1) high enzymatic activity haplotype (also known as ‘low pain
sensitivity’ [LPS]): rs6269/G-rs4633/C-rs4818/G-rs4680/G
(2) intermediate enzymatic activity haplotype (also known
as ‘average pain sensitivity’ = APS): rs6269/A-rs4633/T-
rs4818/C-rs4680/A
(3) low enzymatic activity haplotype (also known as ‘high pain
sensitivity’=HPS): rs6269/A-rs4633/C-rs4818/C- rs4680/G
Haplotypes were reconstructed for each participant using
the software PHASE v2.1 (Stephens and Donnelly, 2003).
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of the behavioral experiment. Expectations about the appearance of the visual stimulus were induced by a placebo-like
paradigm (as similarly described in Schmack et al., 2013a). Participants viewed continuously a dot-kinematogramm that is perceived as a rotating sphere and
indicated changes in perceived rotation direction by key presses. In the initial and final baseline phase, the rotation direction of the sphere was ambiguous yielding
bistable perception alternating spontaneously between leftward and rightward rotation direction. On average, both rotation directions were perceived for equally long
phase durations in the baseline phases. In the learning phase, participants wore transparent glasses which they believed to contain polarizing filters and bias their
perception toward one rotation direction depending on the orientation of the glasses. Stereoscopic depth cues were surreptitiously added to the stimulus, which
forced the sphere to rotate into one direction for 80% of the time resulting in longer average phase durations of the expected rotation direction compared to the
unexpected rotation direction. Critically, in the test phase, participants again wore the transparent glasses that they expected to bias their perception but were now
again shown with the sphere with ambiguous rotation direction. Again, participants perceived the expected rotation direction for longer average phase durations than
the unexpected rotation direction, which in the absence of any depth cues in the stimulus can only be attributed to the participants’ expectations associated with the
glasses (*p < 0.001, paired t-test, p-value based on 10,000 permutations; the bars show the mean phase duration of each percept normalized with respect to the
mean phase duration in the baseline runs; the error bars denote SEM).
Four participants with ambiguous haplotypes as indicated by
confidence values<90% were excluded from further analysis.
Measurement of Unfounded Beliefs
To quantify each participant’s tendency toward unfounded
beliefs, we administered the Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI)
(Peters et al., 1999). The 40 items of this self-rating questionnaire
cover a wide range of common unfounded beliefs with delusion-
like contents, including beliefs in the paranormal, grandiosity
ideas or suspicious thoughts. Items are prefaced with a relative
(“Do you ever feel as if...?”) which ensures the measurement
of the propensity toward unfounded beliefs rather than of the
present endorsement of such beliefs. In addition to simple yes-
no statements, the questionnaire asks for dimensional ratings
assessing the degree of distress, preoccupation and conviction
associated with each endorsed belief. As a previous analysis
of the same data set had shown that conviction scores were
most tightly linked to inter-individual differences in perceptual
inference (Schmack et al., 2013a), only conviction scores were
included into statistical analysis.
Behavioral Experiment
Participants took part in a behavioral experiment in which we
induced expectations about a visual ambiguous stimulus using
a placebo-like manipulation (Sterzer et al., 2008; Schmack et al.,
2013a). In brief, expectations were induced by presenting stimuli
that were truly biased in terms of their visual motion. However,
the subjects were told that this bias was caused by glasses through
which they viewed the stimuli. Crucially, in a subsequent session,
although the subjects retained their glasses (and expectations
about the prevalent direction of motion), the stimuli actually
presented were not biased. This enabled us to assess the impact
of expectations induced by prior experience on perception of an
unbiased stimulus.
As similarly, described in a previous study with a slightly
extended sample (Schmack et al., 2013a), visual stimuli were
presented using MATLAB (MathWorks Inc.) and the Cogent
2000 toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) in a room
with a constant low-light situation on a Samsung R© CRT display
(refresh rate 60Hz, resolution 1024 × 768 pixels). Stimuli were
shown dichoptically through a mirror stereoscope allowing to
control the visual input to each eye separately. Stimuli were
dot-kinematograms (DKs) that were orthographic projections
of a sphere rotating around a vertical axis (diameter 4.1◦ of
visual angle, rotation speed 1/6 revolutions/s) and consisted of
450 randomly distributed yellow square “dots” (total size 4.1◦
maximum 0.2◦ × 0.2◦) moving coherently left- or rightward on
a black background with a central fixation cross and framed by
white square.
Depending on the experimental run (see below), rotation
direction of the sphere could be either ambiguous or
unambiguous. The ambiguous sphere rotating around the
vertical axis consisted of two identical DKs presented to each
eye. The ambiguous sphere yields bistable perception alternating
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spontaneously between the two rotation directions. To produce
the unambiguous sphere used for the experimental induction
of expectations in the learning runs of the experiment (see
below), two slightly different DKs were displayed representing
two different perspectives (maximal offset 0.5◦). This interocular
disparity minimizes the ambiguity of rotation direction. To
mimic the spontaneous perceptual alternations that occur during
viewing of the ambiguous sphere, the unambiguous sphere
alternated between both rotation directions with an overall
rate comparable to the subject’s switch rate but with different
dominance times (80% vs. 20% on average). Debriefing after the
experiment indicated that the majority (80 out of 102) of the
participants did not notice any difference between the ambiguous
and the unambiguous sphere. Of those who noticed a difference,
the majority (16 out of 22) attributed it to subjective factors such
as habituation or fatigue.
Before the experiment, participants were informed that they
would perform an experiment on depth perception. They were
told that they would view a bistable rotating sphere and were
instructed to maintain fixation and indicate changes in perceived
rotation direction by key presses. They were told that standard
3D-glasses would be used in some runs of the experiment. These
glasses, which were in reality completely transparent, would
contain two different filters so that one eye would be only reached
by horizontally polarized light and the other eye only by vertically
polarized light. Due to stereoscopic vision induced by these
glasses their perception would be biased toward one rotation
direction. Which rotation direction this was would depend on
which eye looked through which filter, and orientation of the
glasses would be manually reversed during the experiment.
During each experimental run, the stimulus was presented
continuously for 240 s. The whole experiment consisted of three
initial baseline runs, during which the ambiguous DK was
presented, followed by two unambiguous learning runs, two
ambiguous test runs, and two final ambiguous baseline runs
(Figure 1). In the learning and test runs subjects wore the
transparent glasses which they believed to contain polarizing
filters. The actual (learning phase) or expected (test phase)
dominant rotation directions in each run were contingent on
the orientation of the transparent glasses and were switched
between the runs resulting in one learning run and two test
runs per orientation, respectively. The association between
orientations and rotation directions was counterbalanced across
participants to control for systematic effects of the glasses
on perception. The order of dominant directions across runs
was pseudo-randomized and balanced across participants to
preclude systematic effects of the dominant direction in the
second learning run on the following test runs. Participants
indicated perceptual transitions by key presses choosing between
three response options: leftward rotation, rightward rotation and
uncertain perceptual state.
As a measure of the effect of expectations on perceptual
inference, for each participant we calculated the expectation-
induced bias by normalizing the ratio of expectation-congruent
and expectation-incongruent mean phase duration with respect
to the ratio from the learning phase. Higher values indicate
a stronger expectation-induced bias, hence a stronger effect of
expectations on perceptual inference. Three participants were
excluded from further analysis due to button malfunction.
Statistics
Statistical analyses were conducted using the SPSS program
Student version 20 and the PROCESS macro for mediation
analysis (Hayes, 2013). As visual inspection of the distribution
of the analyzed variables suggested non-normality, in all analyses
bootstrapping methods were used to assess statistical significance
(see below).
To assess the influence of genetic DA availability on the effect
of expectations on perceptual inference and the tendency toward
unfounded beliefs, we tested for correlations across participants
between the number of COMT high-activity haplotypes (2,1 or
0) and the perceptual expectation-induced bias as well as the
PDI conviction score. In order to enable ensuing mediation
analysis (see below), correlation analyses were performed using
linear regression models. Statistical significance of the obtained
regression coefficients was assessed by obtaining 95% confidence
interval by bootstrapping based on 50,000 samples.
To examine the potential mediating effect of an enhanced
effect of expectations on perceptual inference on the relationship
between genetic DA availability and the tendency toward
unfounded beliefs, we performed a mediation analysis with
expectation-induced bias as mediator variable, COMT high-
activity haplotype number as independent variable and PDI
conviction score as dependent variable. Statistical significance of
the mediation model was tested using the bootstrapping method
with bias-corrected confidence estimates as implemented in the
PROCESS macro.
Results
COMT Haplotype Distribution
To address inter-individual differences in dopaminergic
neurotransmission, participants were genotyped for four SNPs
in the COMT gene that define previously described haplotypes
with substantial impact on DA degradation, and, consequently,
on synaptic DA availability (Diatchenko et al., 2005). The three
most common haplotypes account for 11- to 25-fold differences
in COMT enzyme activity (Diatchenko et al., 2005; Nackley et al.,
2006) thereby exceeding the functional relevance of any of the
individual SNPs. As expected, we found that the four examined
SNPs were in strong linkage disequilibrium (all D′ > 0.95)
confirming their location on one haplotype block. Haplotype
frequencies were comparable to previous reports revealing three
common haplotypes (data not shown). As an individual measure
of genetically determined DA availability, we calculated the
number of haplotypes with the highest enzyme function (high-
activity-haplotype, also known as low-pain-sensitivity haplotype
[LPS]) for each participant. This diplotype estimation revealed 14
homozygous high enzymatic activity haplotype carriers (low DA
availability), 49 heterozygous high enzymatic haplotype carriers
(intermediate DA availability) and 39 high-activity-haplotype
non-carriers (high DA availability). Age and gender did not
differ significantly between the three haplotype carrier groups
(p > 0.1, ANOVA and chi-squared test, respectively, Table 1).
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TABLE 1 | COMT genotype and demographic characteristics.
High-activity haplotype
carrier status
Subjects Mean age (SD) Gender (M:F)
Homozygous 14 23.8 (3.4) 5:9
Heterozygous 49 24.3 (4.2) 23:26
Non-carrier 39 26.1 (5.4) 21:18
6 102 24.9 (4.7) 49:53
COMT Genotype Influences Tendency Toward
Unfounded Beliefs
As excessive DA signaling has been consistently implicated in
the formation of pathological unfounded beliefs, i.e., delusions
(Pankow et al., 2012), we first tested whether genetic differences
in dopaminergic neurotransmission are linked to inter-individual
differences in the tendency toward unfounded beliefs in our
sample of healthy participants. We found that the number
of high-activity haplotypes was inversely correlated to the
score of unfounded convictions (B = −5.8, SE = 2.2,
p = 0.01, 95% CI = [−10.1 − 1.4], linear regression
based on 50,000 bootstrapped samples, Figure 2A, see online
Supplementary Material for additional analysis), indicating that
higher genetically determined DA availability was associated with
higher degrees of unfounded beliefs in healthy individuals.
COMT Genotype Influences Perceptual Inference
To investigate the hypothesis that inter-individual differences
in perceptual inference mechanisms might mediate the
observed effect of genetic DA availability on the tendency
toward unfounded beliefs, we next tested for the effect of
COMT genotype on perceptual inference. Based on previous
observations that perception in people with a higher propensity
toward unfounded beliefs is shaped more strongly by their
expectations (Tsakanikos and Reed, 2005; Krummenacher et al.,
2010; Riekki and Lindeman, 2013; Van Elk, 2013), we conducted
a visual perception experiment during which expectations were
induced using a placebo-like manipulation (Figure 1, Sterzer
et al., 2008; Schmack et al., 2013a).
As reported previously for a sample that consisted of all
but one participants of our current sample as well as of three
additional participants (Schmack et al., 2013a), there were
significant differences between expected and unexpected percepts
in the learning phase (difference of normalized percept durations
1.52 ± 0.05 [mean ± SEM], t = 28.43, p < 0.001, paired t-test,
p-value based on 10,000 permutations), and, importantly also in
the following test phase (0.14± 0.03, t = 4.31, p < 0.001, paired
t-test, p-value based on 10,000 permutations), confirming that
participants’ expectations biased perception of the ambiguous
sphere (Figure 1). The strength of the expectation-induced
perceptual bias was positively correlated to the delusional
conviction score, showing that in individuals with a stronger
tendency toward unfounded beliefs perception wasmore strongly
biased by expectation. Importantly, the observed effect of
expectations was related to COMT genotype: we found that the
number of high activity haplotypes was inversely correlated to
the expectation-induced perceptual bias (B = −0.06, SE =
0.02, p = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.10 − 0.02], linear regression
based on 50,000 bootstrapped samples, Figure 2B, see online
Supplementary Material for additional analysis). This finding
suggests that higher genetically determined DA availability is
related to a stronger influence of expectations on perception,
thereby providing a neurobiological basis for inter-individual
differences in perceptual inference.
To further elucidate the found relationship between genetic
dopamine availability and perceptual inference, we tested
whether the expectation-induced perceptual bias was unlearned
over time. However, there was no significant difference between
the expectation-induced bias in the first and in the second test run
(first run 0.43± 0.02, second run 0.45± 0.03 [mean± SEM], p =
0.60, t[101] = −0.52, paired t-test), rendering time effects on the
strength of perceptual expectations unlikely. Furthermore, there
was no relationship between high-activity haplotype number and
the difference of the expectation-induced bias between the two
runs (B = −3.2∗10–4, 95% CI = [−0.070.04], linear regression
based on 50,000 bootstrapped samples). Thus, our current
results do not provide any evidence that the stronger effect of
expectations on perception in individuals with higher genetically
determined DA availability was due to weaker unlearning of
expectations over time.
Perceptual Inference Mediates Effect of COMT
Haplotypes on Tendency Toward Unfounded
Beliefs
To formally test our hypothesis that inter-individual differences
in perceptual inference might mediate the observed connection
between genetic DA availability and the tendency toward
unfounded beliefs, in a final step we performed a statistical
mediation analysis. The mediation model included COMT high
activity haplotype number as independent variable, delusional
conviction score as dependent variable and expectation-induced
perceptual bias as mediator variable (Figure 3). As reported
above, COMT high activity haplotype number was significantly
associated with delusional conviction scores (B = −5.8, SE =
2.2, p = 0.01, 95% CI = [−10.1 − 1.4]). Furthermore,
the analysis confirmed the association between COMT high
activity haplotype number and themediator expectation-induced
perceptual bias (B = −0.06, SE = 0.02, p = 0.01, 95%
CI = [−0.10 − 0.02]). As reported in a previous publication
from the same sample (Schmack et al., 2013a), there was also
a significant association between the mediator expectation-
induced perceptual bias and delusional conviction scores (B =
30.9, SE = 11.0, p < 0.01, 95% CI = [8.651.9]). Notably,
when the measure of expectation-induced perceptual bias was
included in the model, the association between COMT high
activity haplotype number and delusional conviction scores was
reduced to non-significant values (B = −4.2, SE = 2.4, p > 0.05,
95% CI = [−8.90.5] including zero), and this reduction was
significant (indirect effect B = −1.5, SE = 1.0, 95%CI = [−4.2−
0.2], mediation analysis based on 50,000 bootstrapped samples,
Hayes, 2013). Thus, as summarized in Figure 3, the association
between genetic DA availability and tendency toward unfounded
beliefs was fully mediated by the measure expectation-induced
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FIGURE 2 | Effect of genetically determined DA availability on unfounded beliefs and perceptual inference. Black horizontal lines indicate genotype group
means. The dotted line represents the fitted regression line. (A) The number of high-activity COMT haplotypes was inversely correlated to PDI conviction scores
(B = −5.8, SE = 2.2, p = 0.01, linear regression), indicating that increasing genetic DA availability was associated with an increasing tendency toward unfounded
beliefs. (B) The number of high-activity COMT haplotypes was inversely correlated to the expectation-induced bias on visual perception (B = −0.06, SE = 0.02,
p = 0.01, linear regression), indicating that increasing genetic DA availability was associated with an increasing effect of expectations on perceptual inference.
Expectation-induced bias was calculated by normalizing the ratio of expected and unexpected mean phase duration with respect to the ratio from the learning phase.
FIGURE 3 | Summary of the mediation analysis. The association of genetic dopamine availability and tendency toward unfounded beliefs is significantly reduced
to non-significant values when the measure of the effect of expectations on perceptual inference is included in the model (indirect effect B = −1.5, 95%
CI = [−4.2− 0.2], mediation analysis based on 50,000 bootstrapped samples, Hayes, 2013).
perceptual bias. Although, care should be taken when drawing
conclusions about causality, these results provide supportive
evidence for our hypothesis that inter-individual differences in
perceptual inference might provide the link between genetically
determined DA availability and the tendency toward unfounded
beliefs.
Discussion
Our current study, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to
demonstrate that genetic differences in DA neurotransmission
are associated with inter-individual differences in perceptual
inference that are linked to the formation and maintenance
of unfounded beliefs involving suspicious thoughts, grandiosity
ideas or beliefs into the paranormal. We found that increased
DA availability, as determined by a decreasing number of COMT
high-activity haplotypes, is associated with, first, a stronger
tendency toward unfounded beliefs, and, second, an increasing
effect of expectations on visual perception. In addition, we
show that the effect of genetically determined DA availability
on perceptual inference statistically mediates the effect of
genetically determined DA availability on unfounded beliefs.
Taken together, our results suggest that DA plays a central
role in the mechanisms that govern perceptual inference, which
might provide a neurobiological basis for common unfounded
beliefs.
DA has been implicated in a vast variety of cognitive,
motivational and motor functions (Schultz, 2007) and in the
expression of consciousness (Palmiter, 2011). Although, it has
been conceptualized to play an essential role in encoding
precision in prediction error signaling and thereby balancing
the influence of top-down expectations with bottom-up sensory
information during active inference (Friston et al., 2014,
2012), evidence regarding its role in perceptual inference has
remained sparse (Schmack et al., 2013b). This is even more
surprising given the fact that an excess of DA has been
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consistently linked to the formation of pathological delusional
beliefs (Pankow et al., 2012) that in turn can be explained
by a dysfunction in the mechanisms underlying perceptual
inference and learning. In this context, it has been proposed
that exaggerated dopaminergic neurotransmission corresponds
to an increased precision in prediction error signaling (Adams
et al., 2013). Such prediction error signals are assumed to
drive in a feedforward manner maladaptive learning processes
that lead to the formation of unfounded beliefs (Kapur, 2003;
Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Heinz and Schlagenhauf, 2010) and
may result in enhanced feedback signals on sensory processing
that account for the maintenance of unfounded beliefs (Corlett
et al., 2009; Schmack et al., 2013a). However, empirical evidence
corroborating the hypothesized link between DA and perceptual
inference has remained sparse and inconclusive. A recent
fMRI study linked activations in dopaminergic midbrain areas
to sensory prediction errors during visual learning (Iglesias
et al., 2013), indirectly supporting the involvement of DA in
perceptual inference. Interestingly, a placebo-controlled study
with L-DOPA showed that enhanced DA neurotransmission
increases the tendency to perceive expected yet non-existent
contents in visual noise (Krummenacher et al., 2010). This
effect was observed only in individuals with low degrees of
unfounded beliefs, whereas in individuals with high degrees it
was reversed, suggesting complex dopamine effects on perceptual
inference. Here, we demonstrate a linear relationship between
synaptic DA availability and the effect of expectations on
perceptual inference. Thus, together with previous work, we
provide evidence that DA might be critically involved in
feedback signals on sensory processing that align perception
with expectations and beliefs and thus facilitate the awareness
of the environment and self. We suggest that enhanced
dopaminergic neurotransmissionmight bias perceptual inference
toward a state that facilitates the persistence of unfounded
beliefs.
It is tempting to speculate that DA signaling in the PFC might
mediate the observed effect of COMT haplotype on perceptual
inference, and thus, unfounded beliefs (Egan et al., 2001; Joober
et al., 2002; Malhotra et al., 2002). Interestingly, and in line
with our findings, a recent study on the val158met (rs4680)
polymorphism in the COMT gene showed that differences in
DA availability are associated to differences in the susceptibility
to interpret incoming information in accordance with learned
prior beliefs (Doll et al., 2011). COMT substantially modulates
prefrontal DA. In rodents, both pharmacological inhibition and
genetic knockout of COMT enhanced prefrontal dopaminergic
neurotransmission (Tunbridge et al., 2004; Yavich et al., 2007;
Lapish et al., 2009; Käenmäki et al., 2010). In humans, genetic
differences in COMT function are associated with differences in
performance and evoked neural activity during cognitive tasks
that depend on prefrontal DA. Thus, COMT haplotypes with
impact onDAmetabolismmight directly influence prefrontal DA
signaling. On the other hand, dopaminergic neurotransmission
in the PFC seems to be critically involved in perceptual inference.
In rodents, feedback signals from the PFC influence sensory
processing in the visual cortex (Tomita et al., 1999; Moore
and Armstrong, 2003). Moreover, functional neuroimaging
studies in humans have consistently reported that attention and
expectation during perceptual inference not only alter activity
in visual cortex, but also involve PFC activity (Kastner et al.,
1999; Bar and Kassam, 2006; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008),
consistent with the proposed role of the PFC in modulating
sensory processing via feedback signals. Most importantly, in
a previous fMRI study we applied the same task as in the
current experiment to an independent cohort of participants, and
found that expectations biased sensory processing in visual cortex
and were associated with enhanced neural responses in orbital
PFC. Moreover, functional connectivity between orbital PFC
and motion-sensitive visual cortex was related to the tendency
toward unfounded beliefs (Schmack et al., 2013a). These findings
suggest that feedback signals from the PFC to the visual cortex
might shape perceptual inference into conformity with beliefs,
thereby accounting for the endorsement of unfounded beliefs. In
conclusion, there is convincing evidence for a substantial impact
of COMT on dopaminergic neurotransmission in the PFC as well
as for a crucial role of the PFC in perceptual inference. Thus, we
propose that haplotype-associated differences in COMT function
translate to individual differences in prefrontal DA availability,
which in turn influence feedback signals to sensory areas
involved in the molding effect of belief-driven expectations on
perceptual inference and, thus, in the maintenance of unfounded
beliefs.
However, a direct link between enhanced prefrontal DA
signaling and a stronger tendency toward unfounded beliefs
remains to be demonstrated. Conditions associated with
pathological forms of unfounded beliefs (i.e., delusions) such as
schizophrenia have been proposed to correspond to a decrease
rather than an increase in prefrontal DA signaling (Davis et al.,
1991), but these accounts have not referred to unfounded
beliefs but other symptoms of schizophrenia. Furthermore,
although neuroimaging studies in humans that have associated
delusions with altered PFC activation during incentive and
associative learning (Corlett et al., 2007; Schlagenhauf et al.,
2009), conclusive evidence on the role of prefrontal DA signaling
in pathological forms of unfounded beliefs is still lacking
(Howes and Kapur, 2009). This is in contrast to the well-
established association of excessive subcortical DA signaling
with delusions (Howes and Kapur, 2009). Therefore, it is also
conceivable that subcortical DA signaling might be involved in
the observed effect of COMT haplotypes on perceptual inference,
and thus, unfounded beliefs. Recent neurochemical work in
rodents has indeed indicated an influence of COMT on striatal
DA neurotransmission (Laatikainen et al., 2013), and functional
neuroimaging studies in humans have shown that genetic
differences in COMT function affect striatal responses during
reward processing, for which DA is crucial (Yacubian et al., 2007;
Schmack et al., 2008). In this context it is noteworthy that a
recent functional neuroimaging study in humans has indicated
that dopaminergic midbrain might encode the precision during
cognitive inference, suggesting a generic role for subcortical
DA in inference (Schwartenbeck et al., 2014). Thus, COMT
haplotypes might directly affect DA signaling in subcortical
dopaminergic regions, which might, most likely mediated by
cortical regions including PFC, influence perceptual inference,
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thereby accounting for unfounded beliefs. Future work is needed
to investigate the exact mechanisms underlying our current
results.
Unfounded beliefs in the general population have been
suggested to lie on a dimensional continuum with delusions
in psychotic patients suffering from schizophrenia (Freeman,
2006; Linscott and van Os, 2013) that in turn are related
to excessive DA signaling (Howes and Kapur, 2009; Pankow
et al., 2012). Our finding of an association between the
propensity toward unfounded beliefs and genetic DA availability
supports this continuity view of psychosis. Previous evidence
on the relationship between schizotypal traits that are thought
to represent subclinical expressions of schizophrenia in the
general population and genetic variation in dopaminergic
neurotransmission have remained inconclusive (Mohr and
Ettinger, 2014). In this context, the most frequently studied
genetic variation has been the functionally relevant val158met
(rs4680) polymorphism in the COMT gene. The val158 allele is
associated with 3 to 4 times higher enzyme function than the
met158 allele, and hence lower DA levels. While some studies
failed to show an association between schizotypal traits and
the val158met polymorphism (Ma et al., 2007; Raz et al., 2008;
Savitz et al., 2010), others reported this association but results
were mixed with regard to the direction of the association
and the affected schizotypy subdimensions (Avramopoulos and
Stefanis, 2002; Stefanis and Os, 2004; Smyrnis et al., 2007;
Sheldrick et al., 2008; Grant et al., 2013). One potential
reason for these inconsistencies might be the heterogeneity
of the symptoms that are subsumed under the construct of
schizotypy (Mohr and Ettinger, 2014). Moreover, the functional
relevance of the val158met polymorphism critically depends
on other polymorphisms in the COMT gene (Diatchenko
et al., 2005; Nackley et al., 2006). Here, we focused on
the propensity toward unfounded beliefs, and found an
association of this single trait to common haplotypes that exceed
the functional relevance of the val158met polymorphism by
accounting for 11- to 25-fold differences in COMT activity,
and hence DA levels. Interestingly, the high-activity val158
allele defines both the high-activity and the low-activity
haplotype, depending on the alleles of other polymorphisms.
Thus, although our current results await replication, they
suggest that COMT haplotypes might be a powerful surrogate
marker of genetic DA availability for the study of unfounded
beliefs.
In conclusion, our current findings demonstrate that genetic
differences in dopaminergic neurotransmission account for
inter-individual differences in perception related to inter-
individual differences in beliefs. Our study therefore substantially
contributes to a neurobiopsychological understanding of the
variability in individual attitudes of the self toward the world,
ranging from critical skepticism through unfounded convictions
to distressing delusions.
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